44. poglavlje, "Filozofska terminologija"; Theodor W. Adorno
"Koristim se prilikom da vas, najprije, upozorim na jednu zamjerku, koja se odavno upućuje Platonu. Zamjerano mu je da hipostazira pojam, što je, dakle, ono što se dobiva samo apstrakcijom učinio nečim po sebi bivstvujućim. Vjerujem da sam vam u toj stvari pokazao kako je ovaj prigovor točan i kako on nije točan, u svakom slučaju, da je to jako komplicirana stvar; za samostalnost ideje ili same biti Platon ima motiv, ali ni u kom slučaju ne provodi onakvo radikalno razdvajanje ideje i misleće svijesti, isto kao svijeta stvar, kako mu se to obično pripisivalo. Trenutak istine u onom prigovoru njemu počiva na tome što se u Platonovom pojmu ideje, doduše, pojavljuje kako trenutak subjektivnog mišljenja, dakle apstrakcije i korektnog obrazovanja pojma, tako i trenutak objektiviteta, ali njihov odnos zaista nije teoretski reflektiran, sam nije učinjen tematskim. U daljem razvitku filozofije je, međutim, to bilo slučaj u tolikoj mjeri, da se upravo ovaj odnos može smatrati kao perenirajuća tema povijesti filozofije uopće. Objasnit ću vam ovdje još nekoliko termina, jer bih se na tom terminološkom htio zadržati što je moguće više. Ja sam upotrebljavao izraz "hipostaza" ili "hipostasis"; danas se često čuje loša kovanica od grčkog i njemačkog jezika "Hypostasierung" (hipostaziranje). Ipak bih htio taj pojam toliko razjasniti da vam bude moguće razlikovanje ovog pojma u njegovoj specifičnosti od drugih njemu srodnih pojmova. Pod hipostazom mi u filozofiji razumijevamo da se neki pojam koji je sam nešto postalo, nešto što je iz nečega proizišlo ili, kako bi se to reklo u doba njemačkog idealizma, nešto postavljeno, tretira kao da je nešto po sebi bivstvujuće. Kad u tome ne bi bilo vrlo jasnog prizvuka sjećanja na vanjski, predmetni svijet, mogli bismo, zacijelo, reći da je hipostaza jedna vrsta postvarenja. Sjetite se samo na sekundu one čisto subjektivne, pa utoliko pogrešne, apstrakciono-teoretske interpretacije Platonovog učenja o idejama, prema kojoj su ideje zajedničke jedinice obilježja mnogog, posebnog, zahvaljujući njihovoj apstrakciji; hipostaza bi, onda, bila kad bismo ove jedinice obilježja promatrali kao nešto po sebi bivstvujuće, u čemu bi se, u neku ruku, izgubilo njihovo vlastito porijeklo, ona njihova izvučenost iz mnogog, a time i njihova relacija prema mislećoj, djelatnoj svijesti i prema bistvujućim momentima, od čega je ono apstrahirano. U cijelom svom sistemu Hegel je na vrlo duhovit način nastojao spasiti taj trenutak gubljenja. Ali on sam je to smatrao kao trenutak, naime kao trenutak opredmećenja u filozofiji, ne pripisujući mu ono bivstvo po sebi. Možemo reći da upravo onoliko koliko je svaki pojam hipostaza, on opet postaje ne-jedno sa samim sobom i time agens daljeg kretanja. Pojam od kojeg bih ovdje htio razgraničiti pojam hipostaze, to je pojam supozicije (Supposition), na koji ste, sigurno, već naišli ili pojam suponiranja. Pod "supozicijom" razumijemo, a i na to upućuje "supponere", stavljanje u osnov nečega, ali stavljanje u osnov prije svega, u hipotetičkom smislu, dakle u smislu kako se on, recimo, pojavljuje u Nietzscheovom izrazu "antizipierend" (anticipirajući); recimo, ako je to i to slučaj, onda je to i to slučaj. Kad Nietzsche, s izvjesnom pedanterijom, tako govori, onda je tu uvijek u igri više nego samo trunčica ironije. Kad se postavlja neki pojam, a da se ovo postavljanje kao takvo ne izvodi dalje u vezanosti u kojoj se nalazimo, već ako zastajemo kod proizvoljnosti jednog takvog postavljanja, onda govorimo o supoziciji. Bez takvih supozicija se uopće ne može, jer se od ni od kakve spoznaje, ni od koje pojedinačne i određene spoznaje nikad ne može očekivati da daje baš totalitet određenja, koja su njoj samoj, zapravo, potrebna. I dozvolite mi na kraju, da spomenem i treći pojam, pojam hipoteze. "Hipoteza" je, najprije, nasuprot "hipostazi" koja se odnosi na pojam i nasuprot supoziciji, koja se može odnositi na pojam, ali i na stav, uvijek jedan stav, jedan sud. Takav jedan sud, međutim, ne biva stavljan u osnov, da bi jednostavno poslužio onim budućim refleksijama, o kojima se nema više što raspravljati, koje su i inače bez problematične osnove; naprotiv, hipoteza se postavlja izričitom uputom da će ona biti preispitana u onom što slijedi, da će biti verificirana ili falsificirana, kako to svojim jezikom kaže moderna logika.Taj stav se, već unaprijed, postavlja pod aspektom da on, najjednostavnije bismo to, možda, rekli jezikom empirizma mora biti testiran. Tako hipoteza nema ni onaj karakter izričitog i zbog toga lažnog bivstva po sebi, koji ima hipostaza, niti ima onu ravnodušnost prema vlastitoj istini u trenutku proizvoljnosti pukog početka, što se pripisuje supoziciji.
Vratiti ću se, sada, na Platonovo učenje o idejama; za pravilno razumijevanje ovog pojma ideje, u sto sam tek počeo vas uvoditi, zaista je najvažnije: Platon, recimo, ne uči o nekom neprekidnom ili kontinuiranom prijelazu od dijalektike ka ideji, niti o jednostavnom identitetu rezultata dijalektike s idejom. Prisjetite se, molim vas, toga da dijalektika kod Platona, kao uopće u zreloj i kasnoj antičkoj filozofiji, recimo i u stoi, znači isto što i metoda, postupak filozofije; koncepcija objektivne ili realne dijalektike, do koje dolazi u samim stvarima, tek je jedan izvanredno kasni produkt, on se, uopće, prvi put pojavio kod Hegela. Taj proces se onda skida s njegove spoznajnoteoretske metafizičke baze i, sa svoje strane, osamostaljava se u Marxovu dijalektičkom materijalizmu. Ono, dakle, što imamo kod Platona, to je svojstvena sprega između ideje ili bivstva ideje po sebi i bivstva za sebe ili čak proizvođenja ideja u smislu općih pojmova korektnim obrazovanjem pojmova.
Mislim da bi bilo dobro kad biste pokušali, pošto ste se u najgrubljem orijentirali u vezi s pojmom ideje, da taj pojam već jednom toliko izdiferencirate, kako biste bili sigurni pred primitivnim shvaćanjima i onog Platonovog pojma ideje. Ideja se, dakle, ne može samo neposredno osmotriti, jer je ona pojam; Platon uči da o svim ovim stvarima uopće postoje njihove praslike, njihove ideje, a do ovih ideja ćemo dospjeti upravo putem korektnog obrazovanja pojmova. Ukoliko se ovdje involvirani moment mišljenja, apstrakcije, sinteze, ideja ne može biti nešto što samo neposredno treba osmotriti, i kad god Platon govori o neposrednom promatranju ovih ideja, to se dešava na jedan način koji je tako distanciran, da uopće ne može biti govora o nekom promatranju u smislu neposrednog empirijskog subjekta, koji, sad, tako može osmotriti ideje, kao što, recimo, kod Husserla možemo osmotriti bitnosti. Ni pojmovi nisu neposredno ideje; jer bi oni, inače, odista, bili samo nešto unutarsubjektivno, unutarljudsko, upravo ono što Platon odbacuje.
Kao dokaz za ovo ja sam vam, vjerojatno se sjećate, pročitao ono mjesto iz Parmenida. Postoji, dakle, između oba ova momenta, momenta subjektivnog obrazovanja pojmova i momenta emfatičkog metafizičkog karaktera ideje kao praslike, jedan kvalitativni skok – time ja upotrebljavam jedan anahroni, naime opet Hegelov pojam; on isto tako razbija dijalektiku kao što je i sam jedan moment dijalektike, jer u dijalektiku spada to da se ona ne kreće u nekom kontinuumu, već prelazi u jedno drugo. Ovaj kvalitativni skok je, zapravo, u toj metodi onaj moment u kojem najizrazitije dolazi do izraza neidentičnost ideje s mišljenjem; ono što se na ideji ne gubi u svijesti, koja je obuhvatna, obrazuje ili poima. Ovaj skok svoje mjesto, svoj specifičan *, svoje mjesto spoznaje ima u Platonovim dijalozima zrelog doba; ovo mjesto nije ni jedno drugo nego mjesto takozvanih Platonovih mitova. Poslije ovog što sam ovdje izložio, jasno je da oni nisu puki dodaci, poredbe ili ekskurzije u nešto više, do kojih povremeno dolazi; ovi mitovi, u sklopu Platonovog mišljenja, imaju konstitutivno značenje.
Zato Platonovim motivima naprosto ne možete dati dovoljnu težinu, ne samo kad se radi o njihovoj sadržini, jer u njima je na odlučujući način prikazano učenje o idejama, već i kad se radi o njihovoj funkciji u ontološko-spoznajnoteoretskoj osnovnoj strukturi ovog mišljenja. Oni su, moglo bi se reći, pokušaj da se u dijalektičkom kretanju, koje u njima terminira, kao moment iskaže baš ono što se izmiče subjektivnom obrazovanju pojmova. Na jednom od ovih mjesta, gdje posebno upečatljivo stoji kod Platona ovaj mit ideja, u poznatom govoru Diotime u «Gozbi», gdje ona, zapravo, izlaže učenje o idejama, mit se uvodi kao moment dijalektike utoliko što on daje odgovor na ono što je u dijalogu prije nje rekao Interlocutor. Nije mnogo drugačije u palinodiji «Fedra»; tu Sokrat uvodi izlaganje svoga mita, poređenje o kolima s dva konja, kao jednu vrstu kritike, kao dijalektički odgovor na dva prethodna govora, prvo na govor sofista, o čemu ga izvještava njegov mladi učenik, a onda o, tako reći, boljem govoru, govoru koji nadmašuje sofiste, o istom predmetu. Ovi mitovi su, dakle, u sklopu razgovora, ali oba puta nadilaze ovaj sklop: Diotima se uvodi kao svećenica ili proročica, o njezinom se govoru samo referira, ona nije učesnica tog simpozijuma; u "Fedri" se Sokrat, u trenutku kad, tako reći, uskače s učenjem o idejama, poziva na božanstva prirode koja vladaju mjestom, na kojem se nalazi on s učenicima, i predstavlja se kao neko tko je omamljen, kao neko, ako tako hoćete, ko je iracionalan i kao govornik blizak ludilu. Svugdje gdje se pojavljuju ovi motivi razjašnjava se ona insuficijencija subjekta da shvati po sebi bivstvujuće, koje se izriče u ovim mitovima, tako što se prikazuje stanje subjekta koji tu govori – stanje inspiracije, bilo da je to stanje proročice, bilo nekog tko se nalazi na svetom mjestu ili nekog tko je zahvaćen svetim ludilom. Jedna od najvećih zasluga mog pokojnog učitelja Karla Reinhardta je sigurno što je u spisu o Platonovim mitovima, koji je kao posebna knjiga izašao 1927. godine, a sad ga imamo u vrlo značajnoj knjizi «Vermächtnis der Antike», prikazao ovaj osobni dijalektički izraz Platonovih mitova. Ja ovo smatram tako izvanredno važnim ne samo zato što tek odavde zaista možete shvatiti svu dubinu Platonovog pojma ideje, nego i zato što ovdje možete vidjeti koliko je pojam dijalektike u onom izrazitom smislu, kakvog smo ga naučili od Hegela, objektivno, po stvari, ugrađen već i u Platonovoj filozofiji.
Citirao bih vam nekoliko, pažnje veoma vrijednih, mjesta o tom problemu iz Reinhardtove knjige:
«Granica dijalektike se samo izuzetno dostiže u usponu putem same dijalektike. Pravilo je da se dijalektika preobraća u mit.» Ukazao bih vam još i na to da je Reinhardt sigurno bio daleko od Hegelove filozofije, po svojim teoretskih pogledima on je bio skloniji, barem temporarno, georgijskoj školi, premda se posljednjih godina svoga života veoma distancirao od nje. Međutim, on je veoma poučan, jer ovdje čisto preko stvarne strukture dolazi do toga da su mitovi kod Platona momenti preobrata same dijalektike. Ako se jednom pozabavite Hegelom - znam da su mnogi od vas već to učinili, ali sigurno nisu svi, a ne bi bio loš rezultat ovog predavanja ako bih vas mogao navesti, ili da kažem sokratovski, zavesti, da svi to učinite - onda ćete opaziti da i kod Hegela ima momenata koji strukturalno na veoma neobičan način sliče upravo onome što se ovdje naziva preobratom u mit; u takvim se momentima prekida dijalektika, čak, svjetski duh, u izvjesnoj mjeri, zahtijeva da se, time što se on realizira, ne predamo jednostavno onom putu, kojim on polazeći od sebe polazi.
Neću reći da je ova teorija bila ono najbolje Hegelovo i sasvim sam svjestan njezinih tamnih strana. Najpoznatiji primjer za to je uvod učenja o državi poslije učenja o društvu u «Filozofiji prava». Ali vi ćete, svakako ne sasvim bez razloga, moći reći da se sličan preobrat dijalektike u mit, dakle u umirovljeni ili hipostazirani pojam, kako sam vam to upravo pokazao uz pomoć citata od Reinhardta na Platonu, nalazi se i kod Hegela, koji je bio toliko manje poetski nastrojen i toliko reflektiraniji. Ili jedno drugo mjesto iz Reinhardtovog teksta, kojem se, odista, neće moći poreći filološka nadležnost: «To, da nedostaje bitak po sebi, a ideji iz nje nedostaje bitak, da je njoj, da bi bila, potrebna još neka druga, onostrana moć, to nećemo izvesti ni iz jedne pozicije dijalektike.» Drugim riječima, dakle, dijalektici, koja vodi ka ideji, i samoj, da bi došla k sebi, potreban je još jedan drugi moment, koji tu pridolazi. Dozvoliti ću sebi da one među vama koji se, možda, bave poviješću književnosti, a naročito Goetheom, upozorim na to da se nešto sasvim analogno nalazi u, ako smijem tako reći, metafizičkoj konstrukciji «Fausta», naime upravo odnos prema milosti onoga «koji se zdušno uvijek trudi». To znači, taj zdušni trud neizbježno se kreće ka neuspjehu; on, na koncu, mora ne uspjeti, a ono «uspjelo je» dostiže se upravo aktom milosti polazeći od mater gloriosa.
U parentezi bih rekao samo da to nije puka analogija, već da ona ima svoje vrlo duboke duhovno-povijesne osnove, jer je u cijeloj kršćanskoj teologiji bio vrlo sporan značaj učenja o milosti, pa i sam pojam milosti. Već u ranim patrističkim vremenima ovaj pojam je igrao najveću ulogu, kad ga je, u biti, posredovao Augustin, koji se poziva na Platona, a onda na neoplatonizam; iz te platonsko-augustinske mističke tradicije proizašli su teolozi kao što je Luther, a prije svega Pascal. Mističke upravo zato što se ovdje subjektu pripisuje neko znanje o njemu samom, što on, međutim, istovremeno, po sebi i samo od sebe ne bi trebao moći imati.
Još samo jedan citat: «Odnos između ideje i mita», kaže Reinhardt, «je duševni, iracionalni, odnos između ideje i dijalektike je racionalan, međutim zbog toga samo na izgled razumljiviji.» Koliko se ovdje može govoriti o iracionalitetu, veliko je pitanje kad imamo objektivni pravac gledanja kod Platona i s obzirom na to da se psihologija kod Platona, uopće, pojavljuje samo u nesvojstvenom, u jednom, u osnovi, već ontološkom smislu, no Reinhardt je, zacijelo, vrlo točno naznačio onu napetost, koja tu postoji i koja, zapravo, uopće čini bit Platonove ideje. Sami ti mitovi, konačno, koji se u velikim dijalozima uvijek pojavljuju većinom relativno kasno i kao stupnjevi preokreta cijelog duhovnog kretanja, po Reinhardtu su sjećanje koje hrani; po tome, oni nisu poređenja. Nisu poređenja zato što, upravo, ipak, se nikako ne mogu razriješiti u onom racionalitetu, koji nužno provodi k njima i bez kojeg oni nisu. Upravo zbog ove nerazrješivosti, uz to, onda, još dolazi jedan subjektivni moment uz mogućnost da se sudjeluje u mitovima, bez kojeg se oni nekom uopće ne mogu objaviti i što je Platon smatrao onim konstitutivnim filozofiranja.
Ja mislim da je on to vrlo dobro uočio; taj moment, naime, koji se obično naziva momentom *, svetim oduševljenjem i koji se u specifičnom toku «simpozijuma» označava kao moment erosa. Onda bismo, možda, ideju same filozofije, od koje smo pošli u našim razmatranjima, mogli mogli formulirati: zadatak je filozofije da, svojim posredovanjima, ili na neki drugi način, izrazi ono što se može neposredno izraziti ili se uopće ne može izraziti. Ona poznata definicija filozofije na kraju Wittgensteinovog «Traktata», da treba govoriti samo o onome što se može jasno izraziti, da treba šutiti o onome što se ne može jasno izraziti, izgleda mi da je upravo suprotna filozofiji i čini mi se spada baš u onu sferu najogorčenijeg ljudskog razuma koji je ne manje sumnjiv bio Platonovom *, nego i samoj do kraja racionalnoj kritici, kojoj je Hegel podvrgao ovaj ljudski razum. Zapravo, uopće se i može filozofirati samo ako, već svjesni ove nemogućnosti, ipak nastojimo da izrazimo ono što se ne može izraziti. Tko pred ovim kapitulira, tko, dakle, ne započne to nemoguće, upravo svjestan ove nemogućnosti, taj neka diže ruke od ovog prekarnog zanata. Taj je upravo zaista terre a terre, on je down to earth. on je, dakle, suprotan onome što se kazuje u poređenju o kolima i konjima koji, kao što znamo, treba da se uzdignu do sunca. A bez ovog momenta u nekoj filozofiji, pa i kad ona tvrdi da će to učiniti, iako veoma dobro zna da to neće učiniti, dakle bez ovog momenta sebeuzdizanja, uopće nije moguća ta emfatička misao. Skoro bismo mogli ići tako daleko i reći da taj nije neko puko subjektivno raspoloženje duše, već da je on, zapravo, već ugrađen u objektivitet filozofije, u onom što filozofija želi od onih koji se upuštaju u nju.
Sada ću se jednim velikim skokom okrenuti onom preobražaju koji je doživio pojam ideje, naime preobražaju u ono što se u najširem smislu naziva «nominalizmom». Već u nominalistički raspoloženoj kasnoj antici se više ne pojavljuje taj suviše metafizički i suviše opterećeni pojam ideje, već umjesto njega imamo pojam proplesis. Ovaj preobražaj je u potpunosti proveden u modernoj filozofiji, ili, kako se to obično kaže, u novijoj filozofiji, i to već u oba njezina rana, međusobno konfrontirana pravca, u racionalizmu i u empirizmu. Doduše, racionalizam, naravno, u sebi još ima vrlo mnogo onog momenta objektiviteta ideje, o kojem sam vam govorio; ali i ovaj objektivitet ne smijete precjenjivati zato što u racionalističkim filozofijama, konačno, ipak to bivstvo po sebi ideje, ako se pojavljuje - zaista je najbolje izraziti se ovako - spada u subjekt. To se, recimo, dešava u određenju istine, kako se ona kod Descartesa primjenjuje na ideji; ona se sastoji u iskonskim idejama. Već u tome se provodi onaj okret ka subjektu, makar i nereflektirano, slično kao kod Leibniza u teoriji onog verite de raison i kod Spinoze u tome da se ideja, doduše, čini nečim po sebi bivstvujućim, a ne subjektivno proizvedenim, ali je ona ipak odvojena od njega ili ona, barem, treba ući u neposrednu evidenciju, koju ona oduvijek ima za spoznajuću svijest.
Kod empirista je ideja radicalement rezultat apstrakcije. Predodžbu ovog okreta pojma ideje ću vam, zacijelo, najbolje dati ako pođem od njegovog protupola, naime od preokreta ideje u puku predodžbu, kako je to prikazano u nekoliko pasaža Humeovog djela «Enquiry» (Istraživanja); kraće i jednostavnije verzije filozofije Davida Humea. Najviša podjela sadržina naše svijesti, na ovo bih vas samo kratko htio podsjetiti kao uvod u ovaj pojam ideje, dihotomija, koja se kod sveukupnog Humea tiče sadržina svijesti, upravo je podjela na impressions, dakle na neposredne čulne datosti svijesti, i na ideas, predodžbe, dakle, na znanje o onome što nije neposredno prisutno. I sad, u smislu ovog dvodjela, Hume kaže: «Ako se prisjećamo naših prošlih osjećaja i sklonosti, naša misao je vjerno ogledalo, koje svoj predmet istinito odražava; ali boje koje se u njemu pojavljuju blijede su i zamućene u usporedbi s onim u što su bila odjevena naša prvotna shvaćanja. Nije potreban neki fini dar razlikovanja, niti neka metafizička glava, da bi se utvrdila različitost ovo dvoje. Stoga sva shvaćanja duha možemo podijeliti na dvije klase ili vrste, koje se razlikuju po različitim stupnjevima njihove snage i životnosti. One manje upečatljive i manje žive obično nazivamo mislima ili predodžbama. Za one druge u engleskom, i u većini drugih jezika, ne postoji riječ; po svemu sudeći zato što, osim za filozofske svrhe, nije bilo potrebe da se obuhvate nekim općim izrazom ili imenom. Nazovimo ih zato, pomalo slobodno, utiscima; dakle impressions, «pri čemu ću tu riječ upotrijebiti u jednom smislu koji malo odudara od uobičajenog.»
To da se oskudijeva na jednom takvom čvrstom terminu vezano je za stvar; jezik, koji je, uglavnom, pametniji od nas, opire se tome da pod jedan pojam supsumira nešto čija vlastita bit je baš nešto nepojmovno. To je pravi razlog, a ne ono pomalo providno, sofističko, što na ovom mjestu navodi Hume: «Pod oznakom utisak ja, dakle, razumijevam sva naša življa shvaćanja, kad mi čujemo, vidimo, pipamo, volimo, mrzimo, želimo ili hoćemo. Utisci se razlikuju od predodžbi, koje su manje živa shvaćanja, kojih mi postajemo svjesni kad se prisjećamo nekog od svih gore spomenutih opažaja ili poticaja.» Impressions, to su neposredne čulne datosti u pojmu ideje. Sasvim kratko bih rekao nešto kao kritiku ovog razlikovanja.
Kod jedne takve neposredne svijesti radi se o pukom postojanju dotičnih doživljaja ili kompleksa ili utisaka, i drugo, o nečem mišljenom, nečem čega sam ja svjestan, o nečem, ako hoćete, pomišljenom. Svojim veoma fragmentiranim razmatranjem ja sam pokušao da o Humeovoj teoriji govorim tako što ulazim u sam fenomen, što vam stvar predočavam tako da sami nadođete na točnost ili netočnost onoga što Hume kaže. To, istovremeno, bi vam trebalo biti model za jednu drugu spoznajnoteoretsku kategoriju, koju sam najavio samo rudimentarno; to je pojam fenomenologije. «Fenomenologija», zapravo, znači, pojmove vezati za stvar, konfrontirati sa stvari na koju se odnose, onako kako sam ja to učinio na ovom relativno vrlo jednostavnom i elementarnom slučaju razlike između impression i idea. Ako je ova konfrontacija nekog pojma sa sadržinom stvari, koju on pokriva, životni element mišljenja, onda je, svakako, svako filozofsko mišljenje, rekao bih, zaista fenomenologija. Na koncu, nije baš tako slučajno, kako je to mislio Husserl, što je njegova fenomenologija, koja upravo to ističe, nosi isto ime kao ona, tako neusporedivo veličanstvenija, Hegelova, o kojoj on, barem subjektivno, nije htio ništa znati."
--
*biti će dopunjeno
Adornos Ästhetische Theorie von Fortschritt und Reaktion. Fünfzig Jahre nach Erscheinen der „Philosophie der Neuen Musik“
(in: Zeitschrift für Ästhetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft 44/1 (1999) S. 41-54.)
von Manfred Füllsack:
http://sammelpunkt.philo.at:8080/archive/00001077/01/fortschrittundreaktion.htm
von Manfred Füllsack:
http://sammelpunkt.philo.at:8080/archive/00001077/01/fortschrittundreaktion.htm
Theodor W. Adorno: Minima Moralia - Reflections from Damaged Life
(http://www.efn.org/~dredmond/MinimaMoralia.html)
Summary: This is an original English translation of Theodor Adorno's classic work of critical theory, Minima Moralia.
Translator’s notes: The existing English translation of Minima Moralia, by E.P. Jephcott, is good, but stylistically somewhat dated. The goal of this version is to render the pungency and power of the original text in contemporary prose (the alternative is teaching the intricacies of mid-20th century academic English to 21st century students). I have tried to highlight certain theoretical passages and motifs which aren’t quite as explicit in Jephcott’s version (e.g. aufgehoben is rendered as “sublation”, instead of Jephcott’s “preservation”). Where necessary, I have also changed the sexist language of the original, replacing “he” with either “they” or “one”, and added additional explanations of Latin and French terms. Above all, I have tried to do some small amount of justice to the poetry, musicality and beauty of Adorno’s language, which is inextricably interwoven with Adorno’s theoretical innovations. In the midst of the most cataclysmic war of human history, Adorno’s prose radiates the promise of a happiness beyond catastrophe – a happiness which the total system, to this day, denies its constituent members, simply because it is this catastrophe.
Part 1: http://www.efn.org/~dredmond/MM1.html
Part 2: http://www.efn.org/~dredmond/MM2.html
Part 3: http://www.efn.org/~dredmond/MM3.html
Summary: This is an original English translation of Theodor Adorno's classic work of critical theory, Minima Moralia.
Translator’s notes: The existing English translation of Minima Moralia, by E.P. Jephcott, is good, but stylistically somewhat dated. The goal of this version is to render the pungency and power of the original text in contemporary prose (the alternative is teaching the intricacies of mid-20th century academic English to 21st century students). I have tried to highlight certain theoretical passages and motifs which aren’t quite as explicit in Jephcott’s version (e.g. aufgehoben is rendered as “sublation”, instead of Jephcott’s “preservation”). Where necessary, I have also changed the sexist language of the original, replacing “he” with either “they” or “one”, and added additional explanations of Latin and French terms. Above all, I have tried to do some small amount of justice to the poetry, musicality and beauty of Adorno’s language, which is inextricably interwoven with Adorno’s theoretical innovations. In the midst of the most cataclysmic war of human history, Adorno’s prose radiates the promise of a happiness beyond catastrophe – a happiness which the total system, to this day, denies its constituent members, simply because it is this catastrophe.
Part 1: http://www.efn.org/~dredmond/MM1.html
Part 2: http://www.efn.org/~dredmond/MM2.html
Part 3: http://www.efn.org/~dredmond/MM3.html
Magnanimity
Magnanimity (derived from the Latin roots magn- great, and anima, soul) is the virtue of being great of mind and heart. It encompasses, usually, a refusal to be petty, a willingness to face danger, and actions for noble purposes. Its antithesis is pusillanimity. Both terms were coined by Aristotle, who called magnanimity "the crowning virtue."
Noah Webster's 1828 Dictionary of the American Language defines Magnanimity as such:
MAGNANIM'ITY, n. [L. magnanimitas; magnus, great, and animus, mind.] Greatness of mind; that elevation or dignity of soul, which encounters danger and trouble with tranquillity and firmness, which raises the possessor above revenge, and makes him delight in acts of benevolence, which makes him disdain injustice and meanness, and prompts him to sacrifice personal ease, interest and safety for the accomplishment of useful and noble objects.
In his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle considered it the suitable virtue for a great man, arising from his other virtues.
Noah Webster's 1828 Dictionary of the American Language defines Magnanimity as such:
MAGNANIM'ITY, n. [L. magnanimitas; magnus, great, and animus, mind.] Greatness of mind; that elevation or dignity of soul, which encounters danger and trouble with tranquillity and firmness, which raises the possessor above revenge, and makes him delight in acts of benevolence, which makes him disdain injustice and meanness, and prompts him to sacrifice personal ease, interest and safety for the accomplishment of useful and noble objects.
In his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle considered it the suitable virtue for a great man, arising from his other virtues.
On Generosity
Translated by Donald Rutherford
Generosity, in the proper sense of the word, is the virtue which elevates us to do actions worthy of our kind, nature, descent, or origin, which is heavenly; for as St. Paul says, following a Greek poet whom he himself cites, we are of the kind or race of God, who is the source of all minds. Thus, it is in this sense that it is fitting for all human beings to be generous and to act according to the nobility of human nature, so as not to degenerate or to lower ourselves to the level of beasts. This has been very well expressed in these verses of Boethius, the Roman senator: We are all born of the first rank - If we feel in ourselves our divine source2
Thus, generosity, which ordinarily signifies the virtue of true nobility, is taken generally for the virtue by which we bring ourselves to do actions that are at once elevated and reasonable, for without the light of reason and justice, this elevation is only ambition and vanity.
It is necessary, therefore, that the truly generous person show by his actions that he possesses perfections and virtues which are difficult to practice and which are not encountered in common souls. He will have the courage of Pompey, who, embarking on a pressing affair at the risk of a shipwreck, said to those who wanted him to turn back, "It is necessary that I go, it is not necessary that I live." He will have the moderation of Alexander, who seeing within his grasp the wife of Darius, perhaps the most beautiful woman in Asia, subordinated his passion to his glory. As for justice, of which I shall speak shortly, he has a duty to display this above all in his actions.
The generous person must respect without exception certain maxims suited for regulating his conduct. First, he must avoid all that is base and all that he would not want known by everyone. Second, when he is in doubt as to what to do, he will opt for that course of action which appears to be the furthest from any hint of sin or injustice. And just as he must act boldly when his comfort and even his life are at risk, so he must act cautiously when there is a danger of committing a crime, and in this alone he must be timid. Third, he will be suspicious of all that is most pleasurable and that the least man from the dregs of society, if he were in his place, would do as well as him. Fourth, he will be suspicious of all courses of action and all outcomes in which self-interest dominates, and he must act on the basis of a nobler principle. However, as false glory is often veiled by a mask that makes it resemble generosity, it is necessary to consider that every action that goes against justice, that is, against the public good, and in a word, all that is contrary to virtue, is not glorious. All actions that would be justly blamed and even punished if they did not succeed, and that chance alone can justify, are never glorious, whatever success they might have. On the contrary, every action that will be praised even if luck does not favor it, is worthy of the person who seeks true glory.
Indeed, one can judge that the good we receive from glory lies only in our mind, for whoever is concerned with glory must never come to know himself from his fame; from which we can conclude that glory pleases us because it makes us form a favorable opinion of ourselves through the testimony of others, who contribute to our satisfaction. But if we know that these people are mistaken, and the conscience with which we are burdened forces us to confess inwardly our crimes and imperfections, what part could we take in this satisfaction, what pleasure could we find in these vain appearances, while the inward bitterness that fills the mind is mixed with it? It is for this reason that one has always valued more highly the praise of a few excellent men than that of a crowd of ignorant and vicious ones.
Above all, it is necessary to be wary of actions which appear glorious to corrupt men, but which are in fact detestable, on account of the evils they produce in the world, such as unjust and unnecessary wars, uprisings, and all that leads to murders, fires, and public destruction, for all these things can never be excused, except when they serve to avoid greater evils.
It remains, then, only to say something about justice, which is the soul of generosity. In the past this was the occupation of heroes: to punish the wicked and to protect the innocent. And what is recognized as unjust will never pass as generous.
The principle of justice is the good of society, or more precisely, the general good, for we are all part of the universal republic of which God is the monarch, and the great law established in this republic is to procure as much good as we can for the world. This is certain, supposing there is a providence that governs all things, even though the springs of the mechanism are still hidden from our eyes. It is necessary, therefore, to assume that the more good a man has done, or at least tried to do with all his power (for God, who knows intentions, takes a genuine volition for the effect itself), the more happy he will be; and if he has done or even wanted to do great evils, he will receive equally great punishments as a result.
Faith is not needed to know this great maxim; it is enough to have common sense, for since in a complete or perfect body, such as, for example, a plant or an animal, there is a marvelous structure that demands that the author of nature has concerned himself with it and regulated the least of its parts, by all the more reason, the greatest and most perfect of all bodies, which is the universe, and the most noble parts of the universe, which are souls, will not fail to be well ordered, although this order might not be manifest to us, as long as we can envision only a part of it--just as seeing the pieces or fragments of some broken crystals of rock or of some disassembled artificial or natural machine, considered apart from and outside of their whole, does not allow us to know the regular shape or design of the entire body.
We are not born, therefore, for ourselves but for the good of society, just as parts are for the whole, and we must consider ourselves as only instruments of God, albeit living and free instruments, capable of agreeing with him according to our choice. If we fail to do so, we are like monstrosities and our vices are like diseases in nature, and without a doubt we are punished for them, so that the order of things may be redressed, just as we see that diseases weaken and that monstrosities are more imperfect.
From this we can judge that the principles of generosity are the same as those of justice or piety, whereas self-interest and self-love, when it is badly regulated, are the principles of cowardice. For, as I said at the outset, generosity leads us to the author of our kind or being, that is, God, insofar as we are capable of imitating him. We must act, therefore, in conformity with the nature of God (who himself is the good of all creatures); we must follow his intention, which commands us to procure the common good, insofar as it depends on us, since charity and justice consist only in this. We must respect the dignity of our nature, whose excellence consists in the perfection of the mind, or in the highest virtue. We must partake in the happiness of those around us, as in our own, seeking neither our pleasure nor our interest in what is contrary to the common happiness; and finally, we must consider what the public wants from us and what we ourselves would want if we were to occupy the place of others, for this is like the voice of God and the mark of vocation.
But if we scorn these great reasons of the public good for which we are made, by seeking our own advantage, particularly at the risk even of public misery, we could not be generous, whatever profession we might make of pursuing glory alone in our actions, and we could not even be happy, whatever success our ventures might have, for the laws of the universe are inviolable, and we must take it as demonstrated that there is no crime that will not be punished in proportion to the evils it has caused or which we must judge it could cause.
The French text of this essay is found in C.I. Gerhardt, Philosophischen Schriften, pp. 104-8. A critical edition appears in the Vorausedition to Bd. VI.4 of the Akademie edition, pp. 1902-6. Watermark dating of the manuscript indicates that the essay was likely composed during the years 1686-87.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
G.W. Leibniz / Donald Rutherford, UCSD / drutherford@ucsd.edu
Generosity, in the proper sense of the word, is the virtue which elevates us to do actions worthy of our kind, nature, descent, or origin, which is heavenly; for as St. Paul says, following a Greek poet whom he himself cites, we are of the kind or race of God, who is the source of all minds. Thus, it is in this sense that it is fitting for all human beings to be generous and to act according to the nobility of human nature, so as not to degenerate or to lower ourselves to the level of beasts. This has been very well expressed in these verses of Boethius, the Roman senator: We are all born of the first rank - If we feel in ourselves our divine source2
Thus, generosity, which ordinarily signifies the virtue of true nobility, is taken generally for the virtue by which we bring ourselves to do actions that are at once elevated and reasonable, for without the light of reason and justice, this elevation is only ambition and vanity.
It is necessary, therefore, that the truly generous person show by his actions that he possesses perfections and virtues which are difficult to practice and which are not encountered in common souls. He will have the courage of Pompey, who, embarking on a pressing affair at the risk of a shipwreck, said to those who wanted him to turn back, "It is necessary that I go, it is not necessary that I live." He will have the moderation of Alexander, who seeing within his grasp the wife of Darius, perhaps the most beautiful woman in Asia, subordinated his passion to his glory. As for justice, of which I shall speak shortly, he has a duty to display this above all in his actions.
The generous person must respect without exception certain maxims suited for regulating his conduct. First, he must avoid all that is base and all that he would not want known by everyone. Second, when he is in doubt as to what to do, he will opt for that course of action which appears to be the furthest from any hint of sin or injustice. And just as he must act boldly when his comfort and even his life are at risk, so he must act cautiously when there is a danger of committing a crime, and in this alone he must be timid. Third, he will be suspicious of all that is most pleasurable and that the least man from the dregs of society, if he were in his place, would do as well as him. Fourth, he will be suspicious of all courses of action and all outcomes in which self-interest dominates, and he must act on the basis of a nobler principle. However, as false glory is often veiled by a mask that makes it resemble generosity, it is necessary to consider that every action that goes against justice, that is, against the public good, and in a word, all that is contrary to virtue, is not glorious. All actions that would be justly blamed and even punished if they did not succeed, and that chance alone can justify, are never glorious, whatever success they might have. On the contrary, every action that will be praised even if luck does not favor it, is worthy of the person who seeks true glory.
Indeed, one can judge that the good we receive from glory lies only in our mind, for whoever is concerned with glory must never come to know himself from his fame; from which we can conclude that glory pleases us because it makes us form a favorable opinion of ourselves through the testimony of others, who contribute to our satisfaction. But if we know that these people are mistaken, and the conscience with which we are burdened forces us to confess inwardly our crimes and imperfections, what part could we take in this satisfaction, what pleasure could we find in these vain appearances, while the inward bitterness that fills the mind is mixed with it? It is for this reason that one has always valued more highly the praise of a few excellent men than that of a crowd of ignorant and vicious ones.
Above all, it is necessary to be wary of actions which appear glorious to corrupt men, but which are in fact detestable, on account of the evils they produce in the world, such as unjust and unnecessary wars, uprisings, and all that leads to murders, fires, and public destruction, for all these things can never be excused, except when they serve to avoid greater evils.
It remains, then, only to say something about justice, which is the soul of generosity. In the past this was the occupation of heroes: to punish the wicked and to protect the innocent. And what is recognized as unjust will never pass as generous.
The principle of justice is the good of society, or more precisely, the general good, for we are all part of the universal republic of which God is the monarch, and the great law established in this republic is to procure as much good as we can for the world. This is certain, supposing there is a providence that governs all things, even though the springs of the mechanism are still hidden from our eyes. It is necessary, therefore, to assume that the more good a man has done, or at least tried to do with all his power (for God, who knows intentions, takes a genuine volition for the effect itself), the more happy he will be; and if he has done or even wanted to do great evils, he will receive equally great punishments as a result.
Faith is not needed to know this great maxim; it is enough to have common sense, for since in a complete or perfect body, such as, for example, a plant or an animal, there is a marvelous structure that demands that the author of nature has concerned himself with it and regulated the least of its parts, by all the more reason, the greatest and most perfect of all bodies, which is the universe, and the most noble parts of the universe, which are souls, will not fail to be well ordered, although this order might not be manifest to us, as long as we can envision only a part of it--just as seeing the pieces or fragments of some broken crystals of rock or of some disassembled artificial or natural machine, considered apart from and outside of their whole, does not allow us to know the regular shape or design of the entire body.
We are not born, therefore, for ourselves but for the good of society, just as parts are for the whole, and we must consider ourselves as only instruments of God, albeit living and free instruments, capable of agreeing with him according to our choice. If we fail to do so, we are like monstrosities and our vices are like diseases in nature, and without a doubt we are punished for them, so that the order of things may be redressed, just as we see that diseases weaken and that monstrosities are more imperfect.
From this we can judge that the principles of generosity are the same as those of justice or piety, whereas self-interest and self-love, when it is badly regulated, are the principles of cowardice. For, as I said at the outset, generosity leads us to the author of our kind or being, that is, God, insofar as we are capable of imitating him. We must act, therefore, in conformity with the nature of God (who himself is the good of all creatures); we must follow his intention, which commands us to procure the common good, insofar as it depends on us, since charity and justice consist only in this. We must respect the dignity of our nature, whose excellence consists in the perfection of the mind, or in the highest virtue. We must partake in the happiness of those around us, as in our own, seeking neither our pleasure nor our interest in what is contrary to the common happiness; and finally, we must consider what the public wants from us and what we ourselves would want if we were to occupy the place of others, for this is like the voice of God and the mark of vocation.
But if we scorn these great reasons of the public good for which we are made, by seeking our own advantage, particularly at the risk even of public misery, we could not be generous, whatever profession we might make of pursuing glory alone in our actions, and we could not even be happy, whatever success our ventures might have, for the laws of the universe are inviolable, and we must take it as demonstrated that there is no crime that will not be punished in proportion to the evils it has caused or which we must judge it could cause.
The French text of this essay is found in C.I. Gerhardt, Philosophischen Schriften, pp. 104-8. A critical edition appears in the Vorausedition to Bd. VI.4 of the Akademie edition, pp. 1902-6. Watermark dating of the manuscript indicates that the essay was likely composed during the years 1686-87.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
G.W. Leibniz / Donald Rutherford, UCSD / drutherford@ucsd.edu
ENDLESS LOVE 2007 - radni alati
Preliminarni fokus:
- working on the material for the next piece I am at the moment exploring the idea of the body politics in the personal and non personal context, I am also researching if the personal or non personal context exists at all or if we can speak about the over-personalization of the body. In this context, I am very interested about the idea of the impact of external sources and how they can be explored and digested in the process of making material. It is especially interesting to see, within the subject of arbitrarity or overarbitrarity, if the accumulation can substitute hierarchy in that way.
.
Referentni tekstovi
Theodor Adorno:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/adorno/
Generosity as a principle - razrada teksta
- working on the material for the next piece I am at the moment exploring the idea of the body politics in the personal and non personal context, I am also researching if the personal or non personal context exists at all or if we can speak about the over-personalization of the body. In this context, I am very interested about the idea of the impact of external sources and how they can be explored and digested in the process of making material. It is especially interesting to see, within the subject of arbitrarity or overarbitrarity, if the accumulation can substitute hierarchy in that way.
.
Referentni tekstovi
Theodor Adorno:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/adorno/
Generosity as a principle - razrada teksta
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